Willfully  Under Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by Orlando, Samuel P.
Volume 74 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74, 
1969-1970 
6-1-1970 
"Willfully" Under Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 
Samuel P. Orlando 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel P. Orlando, "Willfully" Under Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 74 DICK. L. REV. 
562 (1970). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
"Willfully" Under Section 7203






IV. Basic Considerations for a Willfulness Decision
A. Degree of Knowledge
B. Negligent Omissions
C. Murdock List
D. Application of the Spies Case
E. Type of Bad Purpose or Specific Intent Required
V. Weighing and Combining the Basic Considerations by the
Courts
VI. Abdul and Fullerton Cases: Weak Standards Hurting De-
fendants
VII. Vitiello-A Case for the Defendants
VIII. Palermo-A Failure to Pay Case
IX. Other Factors-Admissibility of Evidence
X. Conclusion
I. INMODUCTION
The taxing system of the United States is a voluntary, self-
* Lehigh University, 1919-21; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1924;
LL.D. (Honorary), 1968. Judge, Superior Court of New Jersey, 1957-58.
disclosure system.1 In order to insure that those who would cheat
the system do not go unpunished, however, Congress has en-
acted a series of penalties, both civil 2 and criminal. Most of the
provisions setting forth criminal penalties for violations of the
Internal Revenue laws including the provisions covering violations
of the federal income tax provisions are brought together in Chap-
ter 75 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 8 Section 7203 of the
Internal Revenue Code, with which this Article is concerned, is an
important 4 criminal misdemeanor' section pertaining to a tax-
payer's "willfully" failing to file a return, supply information, keep
records or pay a tax.0
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the cases defining
1. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 68, contains sections pertaining to addi-
tions to the tax and assessable penalties. Sections 6651 through 6683 con-
tain all the civil penalties. For example, section 6651(a) provides for an
addition to the tax for a late return or failure to file a return (5% of the
amount of the tax plus an additional 5% for each month of the infraction
over one, but not more than 25%), unless it is shown that such a failure
is due to a reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Section 6653(a)
adds a 5% addition for negligence, and section 6653(b) adds 50%0 for
fraud. See generally 35 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Tax Enforcement § 77 (1967);
10 TULANE TAX INST. 384 (1961).
In civil fraud cases the Government does not have to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by clear and convincing evidence.
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943). See also Lydon v. Commis-
sioner, 351 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965); Rohde v. United States, 372 F. Supp.
190 (E.D. Wis. 1967) (a jury verdict acquitting a taxpayer in a criminal
case has no binding effect in a civil fraud proceeding); Gilman, Current
Problems in Criminal Tax Fraud, 33 TAXES 749 (1955).
3. The sections clearly applicable to income tax violations were all
intentionally placed in the same part, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954,
ch. 75, part I, because of Congress' wishes to apply them to taxes gen-
erally, including income taxes. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
147 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1954).
4. This section is used quite frequently. See United States v. Lazar-
off, 409 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1969); Eustis v. United States, 409 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States v. MacCorkle, 407 F.2d 497 (4th
Cir. 1969).
5. In the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code the House bill
originally made "nonfiling" a felony. However, a Senate amendment pre-
vailed and the violation remained a misdemeanor. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5343 (1954). See also Lipton, Current Problems in the Tax Fraud
Field, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 416.
6. Section 7203 reads as follows:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated
tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under
authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required
under authority of section 6015), keep any records or supply any
information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax,
make such return, keep such records, or supply such information,
at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, to-
gether with the costs of prosecution.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7203 [hereinafter also cited as § 72031.
Section 7203 had as its source many sections of the 1939 Internal Reve-
nue Code. E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 145(a), 154(d), 894(b) (2) (B),
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the meaning of "willfully"7 under section 7203.8 In order to fully
understand the impact of section 7203, it is first necessary to dis-
cuss some of its other aspects. The section proscribes four omis-
sions, which if done "willfully," constitute violations under its
terms. The most frequently used provision deals with the failure
to file a return. Section 6012 of the Internal Revenue Code9 re-
quires certain individuals to file income tax returns. Section 7203
combines with section 6012 in order to create the criminal offense.
Under these combined sections, the federal government must prove
that the person'0 charged with a violation of section 7203 had a
gross income of $600 or more, so that he was required to file a re-
turn under section 6012.11 Furthermore, in addition to willfulness,
937, 1024(a), 1718(a), 1821(a) (1), 2557(b) (2), 2708(b), 3604(c), 53 Stat. 1
et seq.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7201 [hereinafter also cited as § 7201],
contains the "capstone" of the system calculated to produce compliance
with income tax laws. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
Section 7201 provides that any person who "willfully" attempts to evade or
defeat a tax is guilty of a felony. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7201.
For cases discussing the requirement of "willfully" under section 7201
see, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 407 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. DeNiro, 392 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968); United
States v. Bloch, 211 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Martell,
199 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953). See gener-
ally 35 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Tax Enforcement §§ 82, 83, 109 (1967).
7. Other criminal sections in addition to sections 7201 and 7203 also
require that the act be done "willfully" in order to convict. See, e.g., INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7204 (fraudulent statement or failure to make
statement to employees); INT. REv. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7206 (fraud and
false statements).
8. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1968). Any attorney
who might have an occasion to handle a section 7203 case should also be
acquainted with the procedures of the Internal Revenue Service used in
its investigations and the procedures to use in order to protect a client's
constitutional rights when under investigation. See Butler, Techniques in
Defending a Criminal Tax Evasion Case, 12 TuLAN E TAX INST. 418 (1963);
Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D.
323 (1968).
9. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 61, § 6012.
10. In Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966), the
president of the corporation in question was held to be the person re-
sponsible for filing the corporate returns under section 6062 in violation
of section 7203. See also Meldman, The Legal Responsibilities of the Per-
son Preparing the Tax Returns and Furnishing Tax Advice and Reli-
ance Upon Advice of Counsel, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1962) (discussing
7203).
11. United States v. Gorman, 397 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 832 (1968); United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); United States v. Grenello, 363 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967); United States v. Burgin,
297 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1961) (net worth method can be used to prove suf-
ficient income).
the government must prove that the defendant did not file a timely
return.1 2 Section 7203 also makes the willful failure to pay an esti-
mated tax or tax when due a misdemeanor. There have been very
few cases on this subject.'8 The few cases indicate that to be con-
victed for failure to pay an estimated tax or tax when due it must
be proven that a return should have been filed, that there is in
fact a tax liability, that the tax has not been paid or has been
underpaid, and that this omission was willful.1 4 Very little use has
been made of the portion of section 7203 which makes the willful
failure to keep records or supply information misdemeanors. Sec-
tion 6001 provides that every person shall keep records, 5 and
other 1954 Code'6 sections provide that certain information be
submitted on required informational returns. When these sections
are violated they combine with section 7203 to create a criminal
misdemeanor violation. There is a serious constitutional issue,
however, concerning the use of section 7203 as it pertains to the
omissions of failure to keep records,' 7 and failure to supply in-
formation.' 8
12. United States v. Gorman, 397 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1966). Note that a "failure to
file conviction" does not require that the Government prove there was any
tax liability. United States v. Gorman, 397 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1968). In
order to convict under section 7201, however, an actual tax liability must
be proven. See MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CODE COM-
MENTARY, ch. 75, § 7203, at 10 (1968).
It is possible to be convicted under section 7203 for failure to file
several types of returns. See, e.g., Piper v. United States, 338 F.2d 1005
(5th Cir. 1964) (failure to file manufacturer's excise taxes on imported
automobiles); Ryan v. United States, 314 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1963) (the de-
fendant was convicted under section 7203 for willful failure to file an
employer's quarterly tax return for withholding and social security taxes).
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); United
States v. Magnus, 365 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909
(1967); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958); United
States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (D. Ill. 1961).
14. See cases cited note 13 supra. A taxpayer's failure to pay an esti-
mated tax or tax when due seems to be the only violation under section
7203 in which a tax liability is required in order to convict. See note 12
supra.
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 61, § 6001.
16. E.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, ch. 61, § 6041 (if there are employee
payments of $600 or more made in the course of the payor's trade or busi-
ness, then information returns must be filed with respect to income tax
withheld).
17. Certain of these required records might be incriminating under
state and federal criminal statutes and the Internal Revenue Code itself.
See the discussion of the "required records doctrine" in United States v.
Grosso, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) and Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968).
18. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), noted in 54
A.B.A.J. 397 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), noted
in 54 A.B.A.J. 397 (1968), 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390 (1968) and 19 SYR. L.
REV. 789 (1968). See also 6 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 291 (1968); Henkin, The
Supreme Court: 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1, 196 (1968); 13 VILL. L.
REV. 650 (1968).
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Not only must the federal government prove all of the factors
already discussed for a particular failure under section 7203, but
is must also be proven that the omission was done "willfully" or
there can be no conviction under the section.19 It has been estab-
lished that a culpable state of mind was required under the prede-
cessors of section 7203,20 and this is still true under the present
section.21 The problem is determining the requisite intent that the
various courts deem sufficient under section 7203 in order to con-
vict a taxpayer for a willful failure. 22 There have been many de-
Petitioners Marchetti and Grosso were indicted in separate proceedings
for violations of the wagering tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. Marchetti was charged with willful failure to register his name
and other information and willful failure to pay the fifty dollar occupa-
tional tax levied upon those engaged in the business of receiving wagers
in violation of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 35, § 4401, 4411, 4412, and § 7203.
Grosso was also charged with failure to pay the ten per cent excise tax
imposed on all wagers accepted by him in violation of INT. REv. CODE of
1954, ch. 35, § 4401, punishable under § 7203.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions in Marchetti
and Grosso and held that the petitioners' proper assertion of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was a complete defense to the above charges.
The Court reasoned that the information required was incriminating. This
still leaves the question open under section 7203 as to what type of infor-
mation a taxpayer can successfully withhold under the fifth amendment
privilege.
The Court also discussed the "required records" doctrine of Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). Shapiro was a case dealing with records
that were required under the regulatory Emergency Price Control Act of
Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 202, 56 Stat. 30. The Court held that the records
were not required to be kept, because the information and records sought
in Marchetti and Grosso were directed at a selective group, inherently sus-
pect of criminal activities, while the requirements of Shapiro were im-
posed on an essentially non-criminal regulatory area of inquiry. However,
the Supreme Court left open the question of what are the constitutional
limits within which the Government can require the keeping of records.
The Marchetti and Grosso cases directly effect the two provisions of
section 7203 dealing with supplying information and keeping records.
The cases seem to eliminate the application of section 7203 in the area of
gambling if the privilege is asserted. However, how the Court will rule in
a purely taxing situation where there is no possibility of incriminating one-
self except for an income tax violation remains to be seen. See Lipton,
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323 (1969).
However, the Court has seemingly left open the possibility of getting tax
records if Congress grants immunity to the taxpayer. See 6 DUQUESNE
U.L. REV. 291, 301-2 (1968). See also Silbeit v. United States, 289 F. Supp.
318 (D. Md. 1968) (indicating that there is a split as to the application of
Marchetti and Grosso to civil cases).
19. For a discussion on how to evaluate the "willfulness" problem
when defending a criminal tax case see Balter, Techniques In Defending a
Criminal Tax Evasion Case, 12 TULANE TAX INST. 418 (1963).
20. Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933).
21. Eustis v. United States, 409 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
22. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1968).
cisions attempting to define willfulness under section 7203. It is
the purpose of this Article to classify these decisions and to analyze
the various distinctions among them.
II. MURDOCK CASE
United States v. Murdock,23 is the most important case in
determining the meaning of "willfully" under section 7203. In
Murdock the defendant was indicted for "willfully" failing to sup-
ply information as to certain deductions claimed in his 1927 and
1928 income tax returns.24 The defendant claimed that he feared
possible prosecution under state statutes if he supplied the in-
formation requested.25 He was tried and convicted. The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
26
The Supreme Court held that the trial court incorrectly in-
structed the jury as to what constituted violations under the
predecessors to section 7203. The Supreme Court held that the
instruction by the trial judge, that he thought that the Government
had sustained its burden of proof, was erroneous. The Supreme
Court also indicated that the defendant was entitled to the follow-
ing request for charge which had been denied by the trial judge:
if the defendant's failure to supply the information was made in
good faith and based on actual belief, then that factor should be
considered by the jury in determining whether or not his actions
were willful. The Murdock case, therefore, hinged on what the
United States Supreme Court considered to be the true meaning
of "willful" under the aforementioned misdemeanor sections.
The Supreme Court in Murdock indicated that under the sec-
23. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
24. The indictment in two counts charged violations of section 1114 (a)
of the Revenue Act of 1926, Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 1114(a), 44
Stat. 116, and section 146 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, Act of May 29,
1928, ch. 852, § 146(a), 45 Stat. 835. These two sections were predecessors
to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7203.
25. The defendant averred that the indictment was insufficient be-
cause of his right to claim his privilege under the fifth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had not invoked
the protection of the fifth amendment against possible prosecution under
federal legislation, but solely under state law and thus remanded to the
district court. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1933) (first Mur-
dock case).
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the United
States Supreme Court rejected the last mentioned principle of the first
Murdock case when it stated:
We reject-as unsupported by history or policy-the deviation
from construction only recently adopted by this Court in United
States v. Murdock [citation omitted]. We hold that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a fed-
eral witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law.
Id. at 77-78.
26. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
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tions in question, "willfully" meant more than "voluntary." The
Supreme Court stated:
The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.
But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an
act done with a bad purpose . . ; without justifiable ex-
cuse . .. ; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely. . . . The
word is also employed to characterize a thing done without
ground for believing it is lawful... or conduct marked by
careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to
act .... 27
The Court then emphasized that an evil motive, evil intent, or bad
faith was a constituent element of the crime in question. It con-
sidered the other omissions in the statutes in question and indi-
cated that Congress did not intend that:
... a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding
as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a re-
turn, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained,
should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure
up to the prescribed standard of conduct. And the require-
ment that the omission in these instances must be willful,
to be criminal, is persuasive that the same element is es-
sential to the offense of failing to supply information. 28
Thus, a mere omission caused by a bona fide misunderstanding,
even if done intentionally and without legal justification, cannot be
criminally punished under the misdemeanor statutes in question
unless done with the requisite "bad faith or evil intent." The
trial court by its instructions had, therefore, been incorrect in not
allowing the jury to decide whether or not the defendant's acts
were willful.
2 9
Murdock seems to indicate that, to find willfulness under the
misdemeanor statute, the omission must be more than a voluntary
and intentional failure done without justifiable legal excuse. It
must be done with an evil motive, evil intent, bad purpose, and/or
bad faith. Some courts have interpreted Murdock as requiring
"bad faith" or "evil intent" and nothing less.30 However, Murdock
27. Id. at 394-95.
28. Id. at 396.
29. The Supreme Court indicated that it was not until the first Mur-
dock case had been definitely settled that one under examination in a fed-
eral tribunal could not refuse to answer because of the possibility of in-
crimination on the state level. Therefore, it was incorrect for the trial
judge to indicate that the defendant's assertion of this privilege was so
unreasonable as to establish the requisite bad faith. 290 U.S. at 396.
30. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (dis-
cussed in section VII of this Article). The Murdock test, as such, has
been called the "bad purpose doctrine." 16 Syr. L. REv. 853, 854 (1965).
also gave a list of other definitions for willfulness, such as an
act done stubbornly, obstinately, or perversely.3' Some courts
have taken this list and used it to dilute the test of evil intent
or bad purpose for willfulness, allowing a conviction upon the
finding of "careless disregard" by the defendantA. 2  These two
interpretations of the Murdock case have been the basis, in part,33
for two diverging lines of cases concerning what is meant by
"willfully" under section 7203. One line follows a strict approach,
requiring bad purpose and disallowing any dilution of the require-
ment, while the other line uses a weaker approach by following the




Spies v. United States,3 5 is the second United States Supreme
Court case which must be analyzed in order to define the meaning
of "willfully" under section 7203. In Spies, the petitioner was
indicted for the felony of willfully attempting to defeat and evade
his taxes. The indictment charged willful failure to file a return
and willful failure to pay the tax as the means to the felonious
end in violation of section 145(b) of the Revenue Act of 1940.36
It was the Government's contention that willful failures to file
and pay, without more, constituted an attempt to evade a tax
within section 145(b). The petitioner claimed that the Govern-
ment's proof at trial, that the defendant willfully failed to file a
return and pay tax, established only two misdemeanors under
section 145(a) of the Revenue Act of 1940. 3 7 It was argued by the
defendant that it would take more than the sum of two such mis-
demeanors to make a felony under section 145(b). The trial court
instructed along the lines of the Government's contentions and also
refused the defendant's request to instruct that an affirmative act
was necessary to constitute a willful attempt. The petitioner was
found guilty and appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed holding that the defendant was
31. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
32. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1966)
(concurring and dissenting opinion) (strong reasoning for following the
Murdock list); Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966);
Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963).
33. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (discussed in sec-
tion III of this Article).
34. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text infra.
35. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
36. Act of June 25, 1940, ch. 419, § 145 (b), 54 Stat. 516, a predecessor
to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7201 made a willful attempt in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax a felony.
37. Act of June 25, 1940, ch. 419, § 145(a), 54 Stat. 516, was one of the
predecessors to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7203. See note 6 supra.
It should be noted that in Spies the petitioner was not indicted for either
the failure to file or pay misdemeanors.
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entitled to a charge which emphasized the necessity that some
affirmative act, other than those omissions necessary to make out
the misdemeanors under section 145(a), must be proven by the
Government in order for the jury to find the defendant guilty of
the felony.38 The Court reasoned that section 145(a) omissions
were punishable only as misdemeanors. Congress could not have
meant by the felony defined in section 145 (b) the same derelictions
it had just defined under section 145(a), particularly when the
felony section was meant to be the "capstone of a system of
sanctions" which had been carefully devised by Congress." The
Court then explained:
The difference between willful failure to pay a tax
when due, which is made a misdemeanor, and willful at-
tempt to defeat and evade one, which is made a felony, is
not easy to detect or define. Both must be willful and
willful, as we have said, is a word of many meanings, its
construction often being influenced by its context. United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 78 L. ed 381, 54 S. Ct. 223.
It may well mean something more as applied to nonpay-
ment of a tax than when applied to failure to make a re-
turn. Mere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished
from accidental, omission to make a timely return might
meet the test of willfulness. But in view of our traditional
aversion to imprisonment for debt, we would not without
the clearest manifestation of congressonal intent assume
that mere knowing and intentional default in payment of
a tax, where there has been no willful failure to disclose
the liability, is intended to constitute a criminal offense of
any degree. We would expect willfulness in such a case
to include some element of evil motive and want of justifi-
cation in view of all the financial circumstances of the
taxpayer.
40
The Court concluded its rationale by indicating that the real
difference between the two offenses was that the felony required
some affirmative action implied from the word "attempt" con-
tained in section 145(b). The Court reasoned that Congress must
have intended, by employing such language in the greatest offenses
against the revenues, some willful "commission in addition to the
willfully omissions" which constituted the list of misdemeanors. 41
The Court then listed several illustrations of such affirmative ac-
38. The Court limited its decision in Spies when it indicated that
the issue in the case was whether there was a distinction between acts
necessary to make a felony and those which make out the misdemeanor.
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943).
39. Id. at 497.
40. Id. at 497-98. This test of Spies has been called the "evil motive
doctrine." 16 SYR. L. REv. 853, 854 (1965).
41. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
tions42 and indicated that there were several such items of evi-
dence in the case that the Government claimed supported an in-
ference of an additional affirmative attempt. The Court con-
cluded, however, that it would be for the jury to decide, under
proper instructions, whether the defendant had taken such affirma-
tive actions as constituted a felony.
Under the Spies decision, an essential difference between a
section 7201 attempt, which is a felony, and a section 7203 mis-
demeanor, is that the former requires a positive affirmative act,
4"
while the latter requires only an omission. 44 However, other lan-
guage in Spies has allowed various courts to take divergent lines
in their interpretations of the meaning of "willfully" under section
7203. Thus, many courts have interpreted the language45 in Spies
to indicate that there is a difference in the "meaning of 'willfully'
when used in the statute defining a felony and that defining a
misdemeanor .... 46 Some courts have taken the position that
the Spies language permits the mere showing of a voluntary and
purposeful omission to meet the misdemeanor willfulness test.
47
Other courts have seized upon the language dealing with the
Supreme Court's traditional aversion for imprisonment for debt
and used it to require a very high degree of willfulness in failure
to pay misdemeanor situations.48 A few courts have rejected the
broad language of Spies as dicta, 49 and have held that Spies stands
only for the proposition that both the felony and misdemeanor sec-
tions require an evil motive.50 Thus, it can be seen that a court
42. The Court stated that:
By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would
think affirmative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct
such as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or al-
terations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or
records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of income,
handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in
transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of
which would be to mislead or to conceal.
317 U.S. at 499.
43. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) (discussed in note
51 infra); see Edwards v. United States, 373 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Marquez, 332 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 890 (1965).
44. Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
45. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
46. Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1958); see
Ingram v. United States, 361 U.S. 672 (1959) (wagering tax case); United
States v. Osterndorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
982 (1967); United States v. DiSilvestro, 145 F. Supp. 300 (D. Pa. 1957).
47. See Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.) reversed on
other grounds, 278 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832
(1960) (indicating that a careless disregard would be sufficient).
48. United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (D. Ill. 1961) (dis-
cussed in note 122 infra).
49. Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963) (discussed
in note 109 infra).
50. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1963) (dis-
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can reach different results depending upon what emphasis it gives
to the various portions of the Spies rationale. 51
cussed in section VII of this Article); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d
872 (3d Cir. 1958) (discussed in section VIII of this Article). For an
analysis of the "two-fold weakness in the 'Spies' rationale" see 32 TEMP.
L.Q. 221 (1959).
51. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1985), is another Supreme
Court case which is helpful in defining "willfully" under section 7203 and
in establishing the difference between sections 7203 and 7201 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
Petitioner Sansone was indicted for willfully attempting to evade
federal income taxes in violation of section 7201. He had not reported a
substantial amount of income on his returns for the year in question. He
contended that this was not willful. At the end of the trial the petitioner
requested that the jury be charged that he could be acquitted on the section
7201 charge but still be convicted on either or both of the asserted lesser-
included offenses of willfully filing a fraudulent or false return in viola-
tion of section 7207, or willfully failing to pay his taxes in violation of
section 7203, both misdemeanors. The requested instructions were denied
and the petitioner was found guilty. The United States Supreme Court held
that the petitioner was not entitled to the lesser-included offense instruc-
tions and affirmed the conviction on the ground that there were no dis-
puted issues of fact which would justify charging the jury that it could
find the defendant had committed all the elements of either or both of sec-
tions 7207 and/or 7203 without having committed a violation of section
7201.
The Court reviewed the basic principles controlling whether or not a
lesser-included offense charge should be given. The Court also determined
that the elements of section 7201 are willfulness, the existence of a tax
deficiency, and an affirmative act constituting an attempted evasion,
citing Spies. However, section 7203, in comparison, makes it a misde-
meanor to willfully fail to perform a number of specified acts at the time
required by law. This misdemeanor only requires willfulness and the
omission of the required act. In Sansone the omission was failure to pay
the tax when required. The Court concluded, however, that it was undis-
puted that the petitioner filed a tax return, and its being false constituted
a sufficient affirmative commission to bring it within section 7201. The
only issue present in Sansone was "willfulness." Thus, on the facts of the
particular case, sections 7201 and 7203 covered precisely the same ground,
and therefore, no lesser-included offense charge was required.
The Court made an even more important decision when it held that
the petitioner's intent to report the income and pay the tax at a future date
did not vitiate the willfulness under sections 7203 and 7201. The Court
could not agree that there was a different willfulness requirement for each
of the aforementioned sections. Thus, it can be argued from Sansone, that
the basic element that differentiates sections 7201 and 7203 is that an af-
firmative commission is required for section 7201, that both sections still
require willfulness, and that the willfulness requirements are the same
for both sections.
The court in United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966), fol-
lowed the above reasoning by concluding that Sansone required willful-
ness to mean the same thing under both the felony and misdemeanor sec-
tions. But see United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1966)
(dissenting and concurring opinion) (emphasizing that Sansone quoted
Spies indicating that there was a distinction between the two sections).
IV. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR A WILLFULNESS DECISION
Acknowledging under the Spies case that there is a difference
between the required acts that must be shown in order to convict
for the misdemeanors under section 7203 and the felony under sec-
tion 7201,52 there still remains the problem of determining the dif-
ferent mental elements that the various courts have considered in
order to ascertain what is actually meant by "willfully" under
section 7203. An analysis of the cases on point indicate that there
are certain basic considerations that the various courts have con-
sistently examined in order to arrive at a particular meaning.
Each of these must be considered independently before any one
case on the subject can be properly evaluated.
A. Degree of Knowledge
The first of these basic considerations is the degree of knowl-
edge, on the part of the individual taxpayer, that the courts deem
sufficient in order to convict under section 7203. Obviously, the
higher the degree of knowledge that a particular court requires
the better protected the individual taxpayer will be. "Actual
knowledge" is the highest degree and would require the more
exacting proof. Thus, in Hargrove v. United States,5" the fifth
circuit court required a specific wrongful intent, "that is, actual
knowledge of the existence of the obligation [filing] and a wrong-
ful intent to evade it .... ,"54 In United States v. McGonigal,55
the federal district court also required actual knowledge in order
to convict. In McGonigal the defendant was convicted by a jury
of having "willfully" failed to purchase the $50 gambling tax
stamp in violation of sections 4411 and 7203. The court entered a
judgment of acquittal, however, because there was no substantial
evidence justifying an inference of guilt. Citing Hargrove,6 the
Thus, Sansone is another example of a case, like Murdock and Spies,
which can be given different interpretations by different judges in order to
reach different results under section 7203.
52. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra. See also United
States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957);
United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del. 1963).
53. 67 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933) (case under one of the predecessors
to section 7203).
54. Id. at 823 (emphasis added). In Hargrove, the court explained
that there is a distinction between the elements of an offense, where a
statute simply denounces the doing of an act as criminal, and where the
statute denounces only a "willful" doing of the act. In the first type of
case, especially those "mala prohibita," the law will impute intent. How-
ever, when "willfulness" becomes an element, a specific intent requir-
ing actual knowledge will be imposed. Id.
55. 214 F. Supp. 621 (D. Del. 1963).
56. It is submitted that the Marchetti and Grosso decisions (see note
18 supra), affecting the wagering tax provisions, should have no substan-
tial effect on this particular court's approach concerning the requirement
of knowledge in other section 7203 situations. Hargrove, upon which
McGonigle relied, still seems to be good law.
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McGonigal court reasoned that there was no direct evidence that
the defendant knew of the requirements of the law. The only
circumstantial evidence bearing on such knowledge was the fact
that the local newspapers had carried a few articles about the re-
quirement over the course of several years. The court did not
deem this sufficient for actual knowledge.
Hargrove and McGonigal indicate how courts can raise the
standard for conviction under section 7203 by concentrating on
the single element of knowledge. McGonigal is an extreme ex-
ample 57 since, even if a court does consider "actual knowledge" a
pre-requisite, "actual knowledge" can usually be shown by circum-
stantial evidence, 58 thereby mitigating the salutory effect this strong
requirement has on the possibility of conviction. 59 Thus, other
considerations must be examined in order to further analyze the
various standards for willfulness under section 7203.
B. Negligent Omissions
The next consideration, upon which almost all the courts
touch, is whether or not a negligent omission under section 7203
is sufficient to convict.60 Almost all the courts agree that mere
negligence is insufficient for conviction."' The action must be
intentional, deliberate, knowing, and voluntary as opposed to in-
advertent, accidental or negligent. 62 Some courts have indicated
that neither negligence, no matter how inexcusable, 5 nor "gross
57. See also United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del. 1963).
58. See United States v. Marquez, 332 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 890 (1964) (a case in which the court considered the "knowl-
edge" requirement "vital" but still found sufficient circumstantial evidence
to affirm the conviction).
59. Some courts seem to lessen the knowledge requirement by adopt-
ing a negligence standard upon which the defendant can be convicted
if he "knew or should have known of his obligation." United States v.
DiSilvestro, 147 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Pa. 1957) (conviction of an attorney
for a section 7203 failure to file). See discussion of the presumption
of knowledge in note 151 infra.
60. This consideration is closely connected with the degree of
knowledge that each court considers necessary. See the discussion of the
knowledge requirement in note 59 supra.
61. E.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); United States
v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d
792 (5th Cir. 1963).
62. See cases cited note 61 supra. See also United States v. Benus,
196 F. Supp. 601 (D. Pa. 1961), aff'd., 305 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1962). For an
excellent example of a tax case in which a court distinguishes between
acts that it considered negligence and others that it considered "volun-
tary, purposeful, deliberate, and intentional," see United States v. Fullerton,
189 F. Supp. 211 (D. Md. 1960).
63. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (discussed
in section VII of this Article).
negligence" 64 would be sufficient to convict. However, some courts
would permit a "careless disregard" to be a sufficient showing.65
A court can, therefore, raise the standard for conviction under sec-
tion 7203 by adopting a test which is far removed from any general
negligence standard.
C. Murdock List
Another basic consideration or decision, that almost every
court dealing with the definition of "willfully" under section 7203
must make, is whether or not to follow or reject the alternative
list of meanings for willfulness enunciated in United States v.
Murdock. The alternative meanings that the acts are willful if
done "without justifiable excuse," "stubbornly," "obstinately,"
"perversely," "without ground for believing it is lawful," or with
"careless disregard whether or not one has the right to so act," 66
seem to dilute the "bad purpose" requirement which Murdock
had seemingly adopted. 7 Two lines of authority have thus de-
veloped from the Murdock decision. 8 The strictest interpretation
of Murdock, and the best one from a defendant's standpoint, is
that the description of willfulness by any of the terms used in the
list, except "bad purpose," is error and grounds for reversal.6 9
The impropriety of using the list has been explained by the fact
that the Supreme Court in Murdock did not even use its own list
for its determination of the meaning of willfulness.70 Rather,
the Court merely compiled a list, by which a jury should not be
confused because it states "willfully" in seven different ways.
7'
Thus, some courts have taken a strict view of Murdock by holding
that charges that define willfulness to mean that it is an act done
"with a careless disregard whether one has a right to so act, ' 72
or "without grounds for believing that one's act is lawful,17 3 dilute
the stringent standards for bad purpose and evil motive that the
Supreme Court had emphasized for willfulness under Murdock.
At least one court seems to have gone so far as to indicate that a
64. United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 869 (1957).
65. Lumetta v. United States, 363 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1966) (concurring and dis-
senting opinion) (rejecting the phrase "or capriciously" as a criterion for
willfulness under section 7203); Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
66. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
67. See note 30 supra.
68. See notes 30 and 32 supra.
69. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) ("plain
error"); Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963) ("plain
error").
70. Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955) (section
145 (b) case).
71. Foster v. United States, 237 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1956).
72. Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963).
73. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1966).
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finding of fact based on the Murdock list was entirely incorrect,
even adding all the individual factors on the list together.
7 4
Some courts, however, have taken a much less stringent ap-
proach and have followed the Murdock list, with its attendant
dilution, for various reasons.75 Other courts have taken a middle
of the road approach by recognizing that there may be a small
danger in using a charge based on the Murdock list, but this
danger will be minimal if the trial court also charges properly on
the concept of bad purpose.78 Thus, by rejecting or accepting the
use of the Murodock list of the alternative meanings for willful-
ness, courts have been able to fashion stringent or weak tests for
willfulness under section 7203.
D. Application of the Spies Case
Another significant consideration, that most courts utilize in
making their decisions concerning the appropriate standard for
willfulness under section 7203, is whether or not to apply the
Spies case. Some cases have used Spies to reason that there is a
lesser meaning for willfulness under the misdemeanor section than
under the felony section,77 thus making the standard for "will-
fully" under section 7203 less strict and weakening the defendant's
position. Other courts have rejected such an interpretation of
Spies, indicating that Spies requires the same evil motive for both
the felony and misdemeanor sections,78 and thus making it more
difficult to convict under section 7203 because of the seemingly
more stringent standard. Still other courts have taken a more
moderate approach to Spies and have indicated that a charge less-
74. United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958) (failure to
pay case) (discussed in section VIII of this Article).
For a thorough discussion of the reasoning behind the rejection of
the Murdock list see discussion of Haner, Vitiello, and Palermo in sec-
tion VII and VIII of this Article.
75. See Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966); Mar-
tin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963); Abdul v. United States,
254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958), 278 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 832 (1960). See also discussion in dissent in United States v.
Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1966) (concurring and dissenting opin-
ion).
76. United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 869 (1957). See also United States v. Gorman, 392 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968).
77. See cases cited note 46 supra.
78. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (considered
"plain error"). See also Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1963) (court reasoned that Congress did not intend to lessen the mean-
ing of "willfully" in the misdemeanor statute because it has a generally
accepted meaning).
ening the requirements for the misdemeanor is potentially danger-
ous, but can be corrected in the charge as a whole.79 Thus, it can
again be seen that a court can adopt different standards for will-
fulness under section 7203 by manipulating one of the basic consid-
erations, the use of the Spies decision.
E. Type of Bad Purpose or Specific Intent Required
Another basic consideration, which the courts frequently in-
terject into their opinions, is the "type" of "bad purpose" or "spe-
cific intent" that must be present in order to meet the require-
ment of willfulness under section 7203. The strictest type of "bad
purpose" encountered, which helps the defendant's position, is that
which requires actual knowledge of the existence of the legal ob-
ligations under section 7203 and the intent to evade the obliga-
tion.8 0 This reference to evasion would tend to equate the mis-
demeanor mental requirements of section 7203 to those required
for the section 7201 felony of attempted evasion.8 ' Some courts
have adopted this strict interpretation of the "bad purpose" re-
quired for conviction of a misdemeanor.8 2 Other courts, however,
use a much weaker test for the required specific intent. Thus, it
has been said that there is no need to show a specific intent to
evade,8 3 that the only "bad purpose" or bad "motive" that need
be shown to convict is a deliberate intention not to file a return,
which the defendant knew should be filed, so that the Government
would not know the extent of the defendant's liability,8 4  nor
receive the return at the time required by law,8' keeping the
79. United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 982 (1967).
80. United States v. Thompson, 230 F. Supp. 530 (D. Conn.), aff'd., 338
F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (section 7203 failure to file) (al-
though the case used a strong bad purpose test, the defendant was still
found guilty).
81. See United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958) (fail-
ure to pay case) (citing many felony evasion cases with approval).
82. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
83. Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
84. Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966); Haskell v.
United States, 241 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957);
Yarborough v. United States, 231 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
969 (1956) (section 145 case); United States v. DiSilvestro, 147 F. Supp.
300 (D. Pa. 1957).
In United States v. Fullerton, 189 F. Supp. 211 (D. Md. 1960), the court
indicated that the key language in the above type of bad purpose test
is "so that" the Government would not know the extent of the liability.
The court explained that "so that" may mean either "with the result that,"
or "in order that." The court concluded that the former was more appro-
priate under the misdemeanor statute further weakening the above "bad
purpose" test. Id. at 215-16 (1960).
85. United States v. Long, 257 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1958) (section 145(a)
case); United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601 (D. Pa. 1961), aff'd., 305 F.2d
821 (3d Cir. 1962).
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Government from getting that which it lawfully requires.
86
Again, it can be seen that by manipulating another basic factor,
courts are able to change the meaning of "willfully" under section
7203. It is submitted, however, that this one factor alone, the
choice of a particular "bad purpose" doctrine, has very little sig-
nificance compared to the other factors which are used by courts
in arriving at their decisions under section 7203.87
V. WEIGHING AND COIINING THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
BY THE COURTS
The basic considerations discussed in the previous section
have been used in different combinations by the courts while
formulating tests for "willfully" under section 7203. In most of the
cases in which the defendant has been found guilty or his convic-
tion affirmed, different combinations of the basic considerations
have been used in their "weaker" form. By "weaker," it is meant
that the court adopted the specific basic consideration in the
form that would be most harmful to the defendant's position. For
example, if the acceptance or rejection of the Murdock list were
in question, the court would have adopted the list, rather than
rejecting it, in order to dilute the standard to be used against the
defendant.
Lumetta v. United States"8 is a perfect example of a case
in which the court took the weaker position on several of the
basic considerations in affirming the conviction of the president
of a corporation for failure to file under section 7203. In Lumetta
the eighth circuit court acknowledged that the jury could infer
knowledge on the part of the defendant and adopted a weaker
negligence standard, indicating that the defendant did not have a
reasonable cause for his beliefs and acted with a careless disregard.
The court also seemed to follow the Murdock list of meanings for
willfulness and the felony-misdemeanor distinction in Spies which
86. United States v. Cirillo, 251 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 949 (1958). See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.
1966). Vitiello emphasizes the fact that the "bad purpose" test which a
particular court uses is almost meaningless as an indication of what result
the court is attempting to ultimately reach. Vitiello is probably the
strongest case in favor of any defendant that can be found; however, it
still used a weak "bad purpose" doctrine. But see United States v. Thomp-
son, 230 F. Supp. 530 (D. Conn.), affd., 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964) (per
curiam) (the court used a strong "bad purpose doctrine" but the defend-
ant was nevertheless convicted).
87. See note 86 supra and the following discussion under Section V
of this Article.
88. 362 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1966).
both dilute the standard for willfulness under section 7203. Fi-
nally, the court chose a weak, "bad purpose" test instead of one
which would have required a specific intent to evade the tax."9
Some courts have relied more heavily on the Murdock list,
rather than on the felony-misdemeanor distinction of Spies, in
order to find a defendant guilty.9 0 Other courts emphasize the
Spies distinction that the mental requirement for misdemeanors is
less than that for felonies, and combine this determination with
various combinations of the other basic considerations, in order
to find a particular defendant guilty 1 Several courts have not
really considered the application of the weak Murdock list and
weak Spies test, but have nevertheless applied weaker versions of
the other basic factors in order to find a defendant guilty.
9 2
All of the courts which have acquitted defendants as not
having the requisite intent under section 7203 or reversed lower
court convictions for application of an insufficient standard for
willfulness under section 7203, have chosen at least one very
"strong" position for one of the basic considerations while arriving
at a decision. Thus, the rejection of the Murdock list of meanings
for willfulness9" and the rejection of the Spies distinction between
the felony and misdemeanor sections94 consistently have been used
as the basis for acquittals. The applications of a very strong
knowledge and a strong "bad purpose" test have also been the
bases for acquittals.93
89. See notes 80-87 and accompanying text supra.
90. Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963) (weak knowl-
edge and negligence requirements); Haskell v. United States, 241 F.2d 790
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957) (weak bad purpose only);
Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
969 (1956) (weak bad purpose).
91. United States v. Pepe, 209 F. Supp. 542 (D. Del. 1962), aff'd., 339
F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (moderate requirement for knowl-
edge and bad purpose factors); United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601
(D. Pa. 1961), afj'd., 305 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1962) (weak bad purpose);
United States v. DiSilvestro, 147 F. Supp. 300 (D. Pa. 1957) (weak knowl-
edge under sections 145(a) and 7203).
92. Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958) (weak knowledge requirement and weak bad
purpose test). See also Ryan v. United States, 314 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1963)
(weak bad purpose-instructions as whole proper); United States v. Perna,
197 F. Supp. 853 (D. Conn. 1961) (attorney convicted willful failure to
file under section 7203).
93. United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958) (failure to
pay case discussed in section VIII of this Article). See also United States
v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (discussed in section VII of this
Article).
94. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966) (strong
rejection of Murdock list).
95. United States v. McGonigal, 214 F. Supp. 621 (D. Del. 1963)
(wagering stamp case); see United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del.
1963) (court applied a strong knowledge test but a weak bad purpose test
and finally acquitted the defendant on one wagering tax violation but
not on the other). But see United States v. Thompson, 230 F. Supp. 540
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The previous has been an abstract analysis of the various
basic considerations which courts choose, weigh, and combine in
order to arrive at a final determination of the specific willfulness
requirement under section 7203 which will be sufficient to convict
or acquit. Another and possibly better way to examine the prob-
lem is to compare a few of the strongest cases in favor of a de-
fendant with some of those applying weaker standards and con-
sequently favoring the prosecution and see how the individual
courts manipulate these various considerations.
VI. ABDUL AND FULLERTON CASES: WEAK STANDARDS
HURTMIN DFENDANrs
One of the weakest cases, which is extremely harmful to any
defendant's position in a section 7203 case, is Abdul v. United
States.96 In Abdul the defendant was indicted for the felonies of
willfully failing to truthfully account for, and pay over, with-
holding taxes,97 and the misdemeanor of willfully failing to file
tax returns.98 The defendant admitted that he knew about his
obligation to file but defended on the ground that he did not have
the necessary money to pay the taxes and believed that the taxes
had to be paid at the same time the return was filed. His defense
was thus based on lack of willfulness. The defendant was acquit-
ted on the felony counts but convicted on the misdemeanor counts.
The defendant appealed, assigning as error the trial court's
instructions on the term "willfully" as used under the misde-
meanor counts. These instructions, however, were held to be suf-
ficient. 9  The ninth circuit court touched on several of the usual
basic considerations that go into making most decisions concerning
(D. Conn.), aff'd., 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (defendant
found guilty under a strong bad purpose test).
96. 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958), reversed on other grounds, 278 F.2d
234 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960).
97. These counts of the indictments charged violations of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 25, § 2707 (a), 53 Stat. 290 and the INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, ch. 75, § 7202.
98. These counts charged violations of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, ch. 25, § 2707(b), 53 Stat. 290, and a violation of the INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, ch. 75, § 7203 which is set out in full in the text accompanying
note 6 supra and which is almost identical to section 2707(b) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1939.
99. The defendant also assigned as error the admission of prejudicial
evidence elicited by the prosecutor. The appellate court held, on this
point, that the cross-examination of the defendant about alleged discredita-
ble business practices had no other effect than to prejudice the jury and
required a reversal. However, the court held that the instructions on "wiU-
fully" were correct and did not require reversal.
the definition of "willfully" under section 7203.100 It indicated that
negligence was not enough under the misdemeanor section, but
citing Spies, said that "willfully" might mean merely voluntary
and purposely. The court indicated that the phrase "bad purpose"
alone would definitely meet the test for willfulness. The court
then reached the crux of its decision by indicating that the terms
of the Murdock list, used in the disjunctive after the phrase "bad
purpose," did not "water down" that term as to make it erroneous.
It went on to hold, by using the Spies rationale, that "willful"
when used in the misdemeanor statutes as applied to a failure to
file means something less than as applied to a felony nonpayment
case.101
Another example of a weak case is United States v. Fuller-
ton.10 2 In Fullerton the defendant, an experienced attorney, filed
tax returns for the years 1939, 1940 and 1941. He was called to
active military service and was sent to Europe. He "negligently"
failed to file in 1942. In 1945 he was discharged and returned, but
again did not file. In 1958 he admitted to the Internal Revenue
Service that, out of pure fear, he had not filed since the Second
World War. He was indicted under section 7203. The case was
tried without a jury, and the defendant was convicted.
The district court held that there was evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had been willful. The court
utilized the same type of reasoning that had been used in Abdul.
It went beyond Abdul, however, by adopting a very weak bad
purpose test'0 3 and indicating that the strong bad purpose test
that reqires proof of an intention to evade is not necessary. The
court explained that the defendant's admissions indicated that he
knew that he should have filed. Emphasizing that the failure to
file in 1942 might have been negligent, the court held, however,
that his failure to file in the subsequent years was without justi-
fiable excuse.
100. The court did not actually discuss the need for actual knowledge
in the case since the defendant had admitted his knowledge. Furthermore,
the court did not actually describe the "bad purpose" test that it was
adopting.
101. The fact that the court in Abdul was charging on both felony and
misdemeanor counts does not change its analytical value since courts deal-
ing only with misdemeanor violations have used the same reasoning to
reach the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Pepe, 209 F. Supp.
592 (D. Del. 1962), aff'd., 339 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (wager-
ing tax case); United States v. DiSilvestro, 147 F. Supp. 300 (D. Pa. 1957).
The court in Abdul also justified its decision on the correctness of
the charge as a whole, citing United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d
Cir. 1957). It is submitted that even if the rest of the charge is absolutely
correct, it is not reasonable to allow the court and Government to dilute
the standard at any time. It may be that it is just that one weak phrase
that the jury relies upon in order to convict. See discussion of Vitiello
and Haner in Section VII of this Article.
102. 189 F. Supp. 211 (D. Md. 1960).
103. See note 100 supra.
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Fullerton is an example of how a court can combine several
of the basic considerations usually analyzed for any findng of
willfulness under section 7203. Fullerton also illustrates how a
court can adopt the weaker position for several of these considera-
tions in order to arrive at a final standard under which a de-
fendant is found guilty. To more fully understand how the courts
pick, choose, weigh and combine these various considerations, it is
necessary to examine a case which takes an almost opposite ap-
proach from both Abdul and Fullerton.
VII. VITIELLO-A CASE FOR THE DEFENDANTS
United States v. Vitielo10 4 was a case which adopted one of the
"strongest" standards in favor of the defendant in order to reverse
the defendant's conviction under section 7203. The third circuit
court did this by adopting several "strong" positions concerning
the basic considerations previously discussed in section IV of this
Article. In Vitiello the defendant was indicted for "willfully"
failing to file income tax returns for the years 1958 and 1959 in
violation of section 7203. At the conclusion of the trial, the district
court gave a series of charges which instructed the jury that it
might find "willfulness" in conduct which was characterized by
mere "careless disregard" of a legal obligation or in acts that were
"merely capricious" or not justified by any reasonable belief in
their legality. The defense counsel did not object. The jury con-
victed the defendant and he appealed.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the
trial court's charge on the definition of willfulness under section
7203 was "plain error."'10  The court explained that there was
ample evidence for the jury's determination. It decided, however,
that the charge to the jury "gave willful an erroneously broad
and comprehensive definition, thus permitting conviction without
a finding of essential scienter."'u 6 The court then indicated that
the Murdock list was merely an enumeration of different meanings
of "willfully" in various contexts. According to the Vitiello court,
the Murdock list should not be read to mean that the various
meanings should be attached to the term "willfully" when used in
a criminal statute. The court reasoned that, in Murdock, the
United States Supreme Court did not really adopt a number of
meanings but concluded that, under the context of the misdemeanor
104. 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
105. But see United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
106. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1966).
statute, the term "willfully" connoted "bad faith" or "evil intent."
The court in Vitiello then explained that knowledge is required for
bad faith or evil intent and that even gross negligence is insufficient
without a showing of the existence of a specific wrongful intent,
i.e. an evil motive. The requisite "bad purpose" was described as
attended by the knowledge of the specific legal duty and the
purpose to intentionally prevent the Government from getting
that which the law requires.
10 7
More importantly, the court rejected the weak interpretation,
announced in Spies and espoused in Abdul, that the misdemeanor
and felony statutes require different standards for willfulness.
The Vitiello court cited that portion of the Spies holding which
indicated that an "affirmative action" was needed under the felony
section because the term "attempt" had been used in the felony
statute. 0 8 The Vitiello court emphasized, however, that even
though Spies does make a distinction between the criminality of
the misdemeanor and the criminality of the felony, this distinction
is found in the additional misconduct which is essential for a
finding under the felony statute and not "in the quality of the
willfulness which characterizes the wrongdoing."'10 9 According to
107. As discussed previously in notes 80-87 supra and accompanying
text, this is a "weak" bad purpose test as contrasted with the specific
"intent to evade."
108. The court, however, really begged the question. It never did
go into the language of Spies which indicates that more may be meant
when the term is applied to non-payment than when applied to failure to
file. See discussion of Spies in section III of this Article. The court, how-
ever, reached the proper conclusion since Spies was really comparing the
misdemeanors with the felony, and not the failure to file versus non-
payment. See notes 109 and 111 and accompanying text infra.
109. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1966) (empha-
sis added). The court also relied upon Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S.
343 (1965), to bolster this particular conclusion. It concluded that Sansone
held that under the facts of the case, "willfully" under the misdemeanor
and felony sections "covered precisely the same ground." United States v.
Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 1966) (quoting Sansone). See Sansone
discussion in note 51 supra.
Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963), is a case quite
similar to Vitiello, which also acquitted the defendant because of rejection
of the Spies' willfulness distinction concerning the different meaning of
the term as it pertains to the mental elements under the two criminal
statutes. Haner was indicted for willful failure to file for three years in
violation of section 7203. The trial court charged that the word "willful" as
used in the misdemeanor statute means with a "bad purpose, or without
ground for believing that one's act is lawful, or with careless disregard
whether one has a right to so act." Id. at 794 (emphasis by the court).
There was no objection and the jury convicted the defendant. The appel-
late court reversed and remanded, holding that it was plain error to so
charge. The court indicated that negligence was the nature of the defense
and that the act might have been careless but not willful. The court held
that the above charge allowed the jury to convict him for mere careless-
ness. The court rejected the Spies distinction for misdemeanor omissions
for reasons other than those given in Vitie~lo, stating:
While the Congress could, of course, have written the statute
so as not to require willfulness as an element of the crime alleged
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Vitiello, an evil motive is required for both the misdemeanor and
felony sections even under Spies. Therefore, a lessening of the
standard under which one could be convicted for a willful viola-
tion of the misdemeanor statute was "plain error."" 0
The Vitiello case covered several of the basic considerations
in this case, Congress having made willfulness an essential element
of the offense, the courts cannot write it out. "Willful" generally
means intentional, knowing, or purposeful, as opposed to careless,
thoughtless, heedless, or inadvertant, and it means nothing less as
used in Section 7203.
Id. (emphasis by the court). The court also concluded that Abdul was
incorrect by drawing an incorrect conclusion from dicta in Spies and Mur-
dock. Id.
The dissent in Haner indicated that the charge as a whole showed
that the trial court insufficiently instructed as to the need to show specific
intent and bad purpose. It also reasoned that the addition of the word
"disregard" lifts the meaning sufficiently when placed with "careless" to
mean "the reckless, irresponsible flouting of the law." Id. at 795 (dis-
senting opinion).
110. Judge Ganey concurred in part and dissented in part in United
States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1966) (concurring and dis-
senting opinion). He took the standard approach to the weak position
with a few wrinkles. He said that when the totality of the phrase is con-
sidered there was no error. After examining the Murdock list, he con-
cluded that this list was a "plain and clear" definition of willfulness ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court concerning the predecessors to section 7203.
See notes 6 and 24 supra. Judge Ganey further noted that this meaning
was affirmed in United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242
(1938). The Judge then went on to explain that the offense of failure to
file is a violation of an administrative command and not one involving
moral turpitude, and therefore fits the situation in which the Supreme
Court had applied the Murdock list in the Illinois Cent. R.R. case. Judge
Ganey then went into the usual interpretation of Spies when it is used to
justify a statement that a lesser standard of willfulness is required for the
misdemeanor section than is required for the felony. See the discussion
of Spies in Section III of this Article. After establishing that, Judge Ganey
then indicated that the cases upon which the majority relied were cases
emphasizing the definitions for willfulness under the felony sections, re-
quiring a higher standard. He also put an opposite interpretation on San-
sone than did the majority. See note 109 supra.
It is very interesting to note that Judge Ganey in Vitiello agreed with
the majority that the use by the trial court of the phrase "capriciously,"
as a criterion for willfulness under section 7203 was erroneous. He rea-
soned that its context was of a lesser quality in that it weakens or dilutes
the standard list established in Murdock. Then sounding like a judge
who had taken a totally strong position on the subject, rather than the one
he did, Judge Ganey stated:
Accordingly, it can be seen readily, since it is alleged in the dis-
junctive, that the jury could have used this standard of willfulness
as its criterion which, in our judgment, is reversible error.
United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 249 (concurring and dissenting
opinion). This portion of Judge Ganey's opinion is quite interesting and
instructive, emphasizing the difficulty in attempting to arrive at a defini-
tive definition of "willfully" as used in section 7203.
which go into most final determinations of section 7203 willfulness
decisions. The court stated that knowledge was necessary and
rejected a negligence standard without an evil intent. It also
chose a strong position by rejecting the use of the Murdock list
of meanings for willfulness and the use of the Spies distinction
between the felony and misdemeanor sections. However, it chose
a weak "bad purpose" position. Vietiello, with its very strong posi-
tion in favor of the defendant, indicates that the choice of a weak
"bad purpose" position is usually inconsequential and that in most
cases the choice concerning this factor has no real determinative
function as to the ultimate strength of the willfulness standard
that a court will eventually adopt. 1" More importantly, Vitiello,
Abdul, Fullerton, and the cases discussed in the footnotes accom-
panying them, illustrate how courts can obtain different results by
taking different approaches concerning the basic considerations.
These cases also indicate that the two most important considera-
tions with which the courts must deal are whether to adopt or re-
ject the Murdock alternative list of meanings for willfulness and
whether to adopt or reject the misdemeanor-felony distinction of
Spies. 1 2 These two decisions are the keys. However, the possi-
bility of arriving at a logical and proper conclusion of what should
be the specific definition of "willfully" under section 7203 is con-
fused by the cases which treat the failure to pay as a misdemeanor
under section 7203.
VIII. PALERMo-A FAILURE TO PAY CASE
United States v. Palermo1 ' is the best example of a willful
failure to pay case under section 7203.114 For the years 1947 through
1952, the defendant filed timely tax returns but was always de-
linquent in paying his taxes at the time when they were due.
The defendant also filed timely returns for 1953 and 1954, the years
in issue, without any accompanying payments. In 1953, the de-
fendant paid a large portion of his taxes due for the prior years,
but he failed to pay the taxes due for that year. In 1954, he paid
only $746 on account of prior years and this was applied to a 1951
bill. Nothing was paid in 1955. The taxes owed for 1953 and 1954
111. See also United States v. Thompson, 231 F. Supp. 530 (D. Conn.),
aff'd., 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
112. But see United States v. McGonigal, 214 F. Supp. 621 (D. Del.
1963) and United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del. 1963) (both
courts relied upon the knowledge factor in reaching their decisions).
113. 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958), noted in 18 MD. L. REV. 354 (1959);
4 So. TEX. L.J. 293 (1959); 32 TEMP. L.Q. 221 (1959); and 12 VAND.
L. REV. 939 (1959).
114. See also Jasen & Pravada, The Nonpaying Taxpayer, 16 SYR. L.
REv. 853 (1965). It has been said that the Government will seldom prose-
cute a taxpayer who files a timely and proper return for failure to pay
because of the implication of the limitations for imprisonment for debt.
B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 901, at 968 (3d
ed. 1964).
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were paid with interest and penalties, in September 1956, after the
defendant had been notified that a criminal prosecution was being
considered. The taxes overdue for 1955 were paid in 1956 and
1957. During his delinquency the defendant bought two Cadillacs,
and staged a $6,000.00 wedding party for his daughter, knowing
that this amount of money would be due on April 15, 1956, for his
1955 tax liability. However, he had attempted to sell certain
property in order to pay his taxes and had offered it to the Gov-
ernment in 1956 as security for his delinquent taxes.
The defendant was charged in a two-count information for
willfully failing to pay his taxes in violation of section 145 (a) for
the year 1953 and section 7203 for the year 1954. The district court
found the defendant guilty on both counts. 115 The defendant
appealed and the third circuit court reversed, holding that the
district court had applied an improper standard for willfulness
under the failure to pay provision of section 7203.116 The circuit
court emphasized that the district court had tailored its findings
in its opinion to the "pattern" of "willful" as defined in the list
in Murdock. Emphasizing the above, and citing Spies,117 the cir-
cuit court went on to discuss several cases'1 8 that had inter-
preted the requirements for willfulness under section 145(b), the
earlier felony statute. The court concluded that these cases indi-
cated that the district court had improperly applied the Mur-
dock standard in order to establish willfulness." 9  The court
then stated that the factors in the Murdock list, "neither singly nor
cumulatively," were sufficient to establish "willfulness" under sec-
tion 145(a). The circuit court also emphasized that "gross negli-
gence" would be insufficient. It then established what it con-
sidered the proper standard for "willfulness" to be applied with
reference to the situation presented in the case:
Willfulness is an essential element of the crime pro-
scribed by § 145 (a). It requires existence of a specific
wrongful intent-an evil motive-at the time the crime
charged was committed; viz., failure to pay the tax due at
the time required by law. A series of defaults indicating a
pattern of behavior, knowingly and intentionally made,
115. 157 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
116. 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958).
117. See 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
118. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Forrester v. United
States, 237 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1956); Block v. United States, 221 F.2d 786
(9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
119. The oddity of basing its decision on section 145 (b) cases was indi-
cated in 32 TEMP. L.Q. 221, 223 (1959).
may suggest the existence of the specific "evil motive."
Mere laxity, careless disregard of the duty imposed by
law, or even gross neglience, unattended by "evil motive"
are not probative of "willfulness.'
1 20
Applying that standard to the facts of the case, the third circuit
court reversed.
12'
The circuit court in Palermo reached its "strong" result in
favor of the defendant by analyzing the two most important con-
siderations which are usually utilized in determining the meaning
of "willfully" under section 7203. The most obvious decision the
court made was to completely reject the Murdock list.1 22 Once it
120. 259 F.2d 872, 882 (3d Cir. 1958). The circuit court further ex-
plained that the district court had erred by finding that the conclusion of
"evil motive" was "inescapable" by reason of the fact that the defendant
"knowingly" defaulted nine times without exception. The appellate court
explained that a knowing and intentional series of defaults may be proba-
tive of the element of evil motive and strongly suggestive. However,
they did not make "inescapable" such a conclusion. Id.
121. United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958). The cir-
cuit court also held that there was insufficient evidence even under the
proper standard and acquitted the defendant on the first count under sec-
tion 145(a) for the year 1953. It reasoned that the defendant had made
large payments to the Government in 1953 of $10,250 on account of his
prior years' taxes and had made substantial payments during the years
1948 to 1952 inclusive. However, on count two, relating to 1954, the cir-
cuit court merely reversed, holding that an acquittal was not indicated by
the record because the defendant had only paid $746 in 1954 on account of
his prior years' taxes and nothing in 1955. Id. at 883.
122. A similar result was reached by the court in United States v.
Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961), noted in 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 135
(1961), by a somewhat different emphasis on the basic considerations.
Goodman was a senior partner in a large law firm. He filed a timely and
proper return for the year 1953 but failed to pay for that year by March
15, 1954. The defendant had been delinquent in paying his taxes from 1938
to 1954. For the period of 1945 to 1954 the defendant's total income was
approximately $163,000. Including interest, his total tax liability for that
period was approximately $49,000. On this liability, the total amount
paid by the defendant prior to December 1954 was $3,000. After several
attempts at collection, the Internal Revenue Service recommended crimi-
nal prosecution to the Department of Justice. However, on January 8,
1957, the full unpaid balance with interest was paid. The defendant
was, however, indicted on January 14, 1957, for willful failure to pay his
taxes in violation of section 145 (a) for the year 1953.
The district court found, in fact, that the defendant's pattern of be-
havior indicated a man who could not pay his taxes, not one who willfully
failed to pay. On January 1, 1953, the liabilities of Goodman exceeded
his liquid assets by $31,000. The next year this deficit was even more.
Goodman lived in a rented apartment, and did not own an automobile,
real estate, or stocks. He had been in an insolvent situation for several
years. The facts further showed that the defendant's wife and son had
been seriously ill during the period in question as was his father-in-law
whom defendant had supported until his death in 1954.
The district court, in Goodman, cited several cases for its decision that
there was no willfulness proven. It relied on Murdock to indicate that a
bona fide misunderstanding would not create criminality. It also adopted
the Spies rationale concerning the differences between the evasion sec-
tion and the nonpayment misdemeanor and the difference between non-
payment and non-filing. Even more importantly, however, the court
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did that, strong knowledge and negligence positions directly fol-
lowed. The Palermo decision could have been based entirely on
that one determination. The same basic result could have been
reached if the court would have indicated that, while it was re-
jecting the Murdock list, it was still requiring the bad purpose
and evil intent that the Supreme Court had emphasized in Mur-
dock. The same result would also have been obtained whether or
not the court chose to follow the "bad purpose" test that it did.12
However, by citing the section 145(b) cases, the court seems to in-
dicate that an intent to evade is necessary. The court's citation of
both the section 145(b) cases and Spies seems to indicate that the
evil motive doctrine of Spies was adopted.
124
The real problem with the Palermo case is not with its ap-
plicability in misdemeanor failure to pay cases. The Palermo line
of reasoning will probably be used in those types of cases in the
future.125 However, a tremendous problem of interpretation arises
when an attempt is made to determine how courts could apply
Palermo to other section 7201 and section 7203 willfulness problems.
There seems to be a problem in applying the Palermo test to
emphasized that there was insufficient evidence before it to show "willful-
ness," especially in a case of this nature which falls within the shadow of
imprisonment for debt. This last factor seems to be the underlying basis
for the whole Goodman decision.
The court in Goodman also relied on the Palermo case and standard.
See note 120 and accompanying text supra. The district court considered
the two cases to be quite similar except that Palermo had had money
available with which to pay his taxes while Goodman was insolvent, a
factor which made the decision in Goodman's favor even easier. By em-
phasizing the Spies rationale, while citing Murdock and relying on Pa-
lermo, the opinion showed a different approach to the misdemeanor non-
payment problem than that of Palermo. Palermo had completely rejected
Murdock, while Goodman had not. Furthermore, Palermo had seemingly
adopted the Spies evil motive test without emphasizing the possibility of
imprisonment for debt in non-payment cases.
This shows that courts can interpret the same cases somewhat dif-
ferently in order to arrive at the same result. This difference in emphasis
and interpretation, while reaching the same result, points to the basic
problem in the whole area. Different courts have used the Spies and
Murdock decisions in so many ways that it has become obvious that these
decisions can be reasonably interpreted in whatever manner the courts
wish in order to arrive at what is considered an equitable decision.
123. See United States v. Thompson, 230 F. Supp. 530 (D. Conn.),
aff'd., 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (defendant was found
guilty even though the court indicated an intent to evade was necessary).
124. See 32 TEMP. L.Q. 221, 223 (1959). See also United States v.
Magnus, 365 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966) (a case which seems to indicate
that the Spies "evil motive" rationale has become an accepted standard
for the few non-payment misdemeanor cases that do develop).
125. See 11 DzPAuLL. REv. 135, 141 (1961).
misdemeanor failure to file cases. The language in Spies that
"[willful] may well mean something more as applied to non-pay-
ment of a tax than when applied to failure to make a return," on
its face, would seem to prevent such an application of Palermo to
a failure to file case, because Palermo was a failure to pay case.
However, at least two cases have rejected the above language of
Spies,128 making it possible to apply Palermo to failure to file
situations. Haner v. United States12 7 rejected the above distinction
in Spies by indicating that Congress had used the word "willfully"
in both statutes and, hence, it could not be ignored by the courts.
Haner, therefore, rejected the Government's argument that "will-
ful" means something less when used in the misdemeanor statute,
than when used in the felony statute.128  Vitiello v. United
States1 28 reached the same result as Haner by emphasizing that
the Supreme Court in Spies had indicated that:
willfulness, for purpose of both the misdemeanor in ques-
tion and the felony of "willfully" attempting to evade taxes
includes some element of evil motive and want of justifi-
cation in view of all the financial circumstances of the tax-
payer [citation omitted] .18o
This interpretation of Spies by the court in Vitiello, in effect,
rejects the distinction drawn in Spies between willfully in mis-
demeanor and felony cases. More importantly, the Vitiello case
cites both Haner and Palermo to support its contention that a
charge including "careless disregard" is an improper dilution of the
standard for willfulness under section 7203. The Vitiello court's
reliance on Palermo can have great interpretational significance.
Assuming that Vitiello was correct in relying on Palermo, '1 it is
reasonable to argue that the "evil motive" standard of Palermo1a2
should also be applied in failure to file cases under the Vitiello
126. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v.
United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963).
127. 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963) (discussed in note 109 supra).
128. The real basis of the Haner decision is that there cannot be any
really meaningful distinction made between the mental element required
for conviction under two statutes that use the same word, "willfully," to
define that standard. Actually Spies indicates this because the real issue
in that case turned on the difference between the acts required under the
two statutes, not the mental elements. What Spies said concerning the
difference between the failure to pay omission and the failure to file omis-
sion seems to be pure dicta.
129. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966). See the
discussion of Vitiello in Section VII of this Article.
130. Id. at 242.
131. It is reasonable to argue that Vitiello was correct in relying on
Palermo, a failure to pay case, under the rationale of Haner that the Spies
failure to pay-failure to file distinction was pure dicta. See notes 128-129
and accompanying text supra.
132. See note 121 and accompanying text supra which indicate that
Palermo adopted the Spies evil motive standard in a failure to pay situa-
tion. Thus, it can be also argued that Vitiello, although it rejected the
Spies failure to pay-failure to file distinction, adopted the basic evil mo-
tive test of Spies by relying on Palermo.
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rationale. Even more interestingly, Vitiello's reliance on Palermo
can be used to argue that the Palermo evil motive test can be ap-
plied in section 7201 felony evasion cases as well, 133 since Palermo
can be reasonably interpreted to mean that it would apply the
same standard for section 7203 evasion cases as it would for section
7203 failure to pay cases.8 4 Since Vitieflo 35 rejected the failure to
pay-failure to file distinction of Spies, and since it had relied on
Palermo which can be interpreted to apply the same standard in
evasion and failure to pay cases, Vitiello can be interpreted to mean
that the third circuit would apply the same "evil motive" test to
all section 7201 and section 7203 violations. This interpretation of
Vitiello is further bolstered by the fact that the court in Vitiello
also relied on Sansone v. United States.136 Sansone can be broadly
interpreted to mean that the standard for willfulness is the same
under both the misdemeanor and felony sections.'
8 7
Whatever can be said for the above lines of reasoning, there
are three conclusions that can be drawn from the Palermo case."
8
First, the test under Palermo, and the facts of the case, indicate
that it will be very difficult to get a conviction for failure to
pay under the misdemeanor section. 39 Second, since Palermo
and Vitiello are both third circuit cases and Vitiello relied upon
Palermo, it seems clear that the third circuit will use the strong
Palermo test for all section 7203 misdemeanor violations. Third,
the various possible interpretations concerning the application of
Palermo to the misdemeanor and the felony sections indicate the
almost impossible task of trying to evaluate Palermo's effect on
the area of willfulness as a whole. The possibility of reasonably
using the Palermo decision, and Vitiello's reliance upon it, to
133. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to define the
meaning of willfulness under the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 75, § 7201.
However, this discussion is meant to indicate how Vitiello's reliance on
Palermo could be used to affect the test for section 7201 if a court so desired.
134. This line of reasoning would be taken from dicta since Palermo
was purely a section 7203 failure to pay case. However, the conclusion
could be reached because of the following factors. The Palermo court
relied heavily on felony evasion cases under section 145 (b). See note 118
and accompanying text supra. Palermo also cited Spies which could be
broadly interpreted as such.
135. See also Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963).
136. 380 U.S. 343 (1965), noted in 51 A.B.A.J. 576 (1965); see notes 51
and 109 supra.
137. Id.
138. See also United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (D. 111. 1961)
(discussed in note 122 supra).
139. See 18 MD. L. REv. 354, 355 (1954); 32 TEMP. L.Q. 221, 225 (1959).
But see United States v. Magnus, 365 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 909 (1966).
arrive at many different results illustrates the whole problem of
attempting to arrive at a suitable definition for "willfully" under
section 7203. Murdock, Spies, Sansone, Palermo, and Vitiello, can
all be interpreted in various ways, and have been variously in-
terpreted in order to arrive at several different standards for
willfulness. It is submitted that the above cases, because of the
possibility of the various reasonable interpretations of each, can-
not be used as a real basis for arriving at the best possible defini-
tion of "willfully" under section 7203. Other collateral factors
must be examined to evaluate the actual policy considerations
that come into play in order to arrive at a meaningful definition.
IX. OTHER FACToRs-ADmIssmIITY OF EvmFECE
The most important factor, outside the question of legal
standards for willfulness, is the question of the type of evidence
which courts deem admissible to show willfulness.
The general rule is that when the specific intent of willful-
ness is an element of a crime, it must be proven by independent
evidence. 140 Willfulness can, however, be shown by circumstantial
evidence.141 More must be shown than a mere omission, 14 2 but a
series of defaults, indicating a pattern of behavior, knowing and
intentionally made, may suggest the existence of willfulness, i.e.
an "evil motive."' 43 Such a pattern of behavior, as distinguished
from a single occurrence, suggests willfulness.'" Thus, the tax-
payer's prior tax paying history, both state, 145 and federal, 46 has
been admissible as being relevant.
United States v. Johnson147 is an example of a court's choice
between the conflicting interests concerning the admission of such
pattern of behavior evidence which lead to the conviction of the
defendant. The defendant architect was charged with failing to
140. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) (a section 145(b)
net worth case).
141. Gennaro v. United States, 369 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1966) (wagering
case) ; United States v. Burgin, 297 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1961) (use of the net
worth method was approved in proving failure to file under section 7203);
United States v. Cirillo, 251 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
949 (1958) (specific intent to deprive the Government).
142. United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 869 (1957) (failure to file).
143. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) (a section 145(b)
net worth case); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958)
(failure to pay case over five years).
144. Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963) ("careless
disregard"); United States v. Benus, 196 F. Supp. 601 (D. Pa. 1961), aff'd.,
305 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1962) (section 7203 failure to file).
145. United States v. Magnus, 365 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967) (sections 7201 and 7203 case).
146. United States v. Johnson, 386 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1967) (section
7203 failure to file); Ayash v. United States, 352 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1965) (failure to file section 7203).
147. 386 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1967).
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file his personal income tax returns for the years 1960, 1961 and
1962 in violation of section 7203. The Government's evidence also
showed no returns for 1955 and 1956. The defendant's defense
was lack of willfulness in that he did not have the funds to
accompany his returns which he thought was a condition precedent
to such filing. He also maintained that the filing of the firm's
partnership returns negated any proof of willfulness. The district
court's finding of guilt was affirmed on the basis that willfulness
was a question for the finder of fact and that the appellate court
could not find as a matter of law that there was insufficient evi-
dence. The third circuit court also held that the introduction of
evidence of failure to file in years not in question was not preju-
dicial.148 A strong dissent maintained that the failure to file for
the pre-indictment years of 1955 and 1956 should have been inad-
missible.149 This evidence had been introduced to show a "pat-
tern" in order to prove intent, but it had shown no such pattern.
The supposed pattern showed a failure to file in 1955 and 1956,
filing from 1957 to 1959, and the failure to file again for 1960 to
1962 for which he had been convicted. The dissent reasoned that
" 'a pattern of behavior' cannot be fashioned like a jigsaw puzzle
out of disjointed elements."' 50
The importance of the Johnson case is that it indicates the
148. See Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958). Ripperger deals with circumstantial evi-
dence, since no affirmative acts of concealment were shown, other than a
pattern of omissions by an attorney. However, evidence of affirmative
acts of concealment during the period in question, which would meet the
affirmative acts requirement under Spies to show evasion, have been held
admissible under section 7203. See United States v. Marquez, 332 F.2d 162
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S 890 (1964) (wagering case); United States
v. Thompson, 230 F. Supp. 530 (D. Conn.), aff'd., 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1964) (per curiam) (allowing evidence of facts after the years in question).
See also United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958) (failure to
pay case) (discussion of evidence dealing with facts after the defendant's
mental state came into question). But see United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d
8 (4th Cir. 1962) (a section 145 (a) and (b) case) (holding that the Gov-
ernment could not introduce evidence which occurred several years after
the years in question to show intent, since this evidence was of acts of
resistance to the investigation which were permissible under the fifth
amendment to the Constitution), noted in 17 S.W.L.J. 320 (1963).
It should also be emphasized that it has sometimes been held that evi-
dence in pre-indictment years of failure to file has been held inadmissible
to show an intent to evade for the years under indictment. United States
v. Long, 257 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1958) (a section 145(a) and section 145(b)
case).
149. United States v. Johnson, 386 F.2d 630, 631 (3d Cir. 1967) (dis-
senting opinion).
150. Id. at 632.
importance of the actual evidence introduced at trial over and
above the choice of standards applied by a court. Johnson was
decided in the third circuit after both Palermo and Vitiello had
been decided. The third circuit, therefore, had very strong stand-
ards for willfulness under section 7203. However, the court's
decision concerning the admissibility of evidence lead to the de-
fendant's conviction,151 despite the third circuit's standard for
willfulness which inures to the benefit of the defendant.
The court's decision in Johnson in favor of admissibility, and
the rejection by courts and juries of certain basic defenses,
152
151. Another method by which courts have taken a very tough ap-
proach against the defendant is indicated by at least a few cases which
have held that the evidence from which a jury might draw an inference
of knowledge of the law is aided or supplemented by a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the defendants knew the law. The leading such case is
Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'g 321 F.2d 324
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965), noted in 33 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 790 (1965) (criticizing case) and 67 W. VA. L. REV. 153 (1963).
In Edwards, the defendants were convicted of violating section 7203
by willfully failing to register for and pay the gambling tax as required
by the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 35, §§ 4411, 4412. This case was followed
in other fifth circuit cases. See Sklaroff v. United States, 381 F.2d 559
(5th Cir. 1967), vacated, 389 F.2d 1004 (1968); Evans v. United States,
349 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1965).
The Edwards case has never been directly overruled, although in es-
sence it has been. Skiaroff, which had relied upon Edwards, was vacated
because of Marchetti and Grosso. Discussed in note 18 supra. But those
two cases overruled the wagering tax provisions. The question remains
as to whether the fifth circuit would use the presumption in other situa-
tions. It seems unlikely. The case itself emphasized the gambling aspect.
Secondly, an earlier case in the same circuit is a leading case for the oppo-
site proposition. United States v. McGonigal, 214 F. Supp. 621 (D. Del.
1963). But even more importantly, future courts will probably recognize
what a serious challenge the Edwards case is to the presumption of inno-
cence and will refuse to apply such presumptions to areas not involved
with gambling.
152. An examination of the various unsuccessful defenses that have
been attempted gives a good indication of the strict approaches that the
courts have, in fact, adopted and the difficulty of obtaining an acquittal.
Whatever standard is used by the court in determining what is necessary
to show willfulness under section 7203, there are certain basic defenses
which are raised by the defendants. All are attempts to try to show lack
of willfulness, whether merely a knowing and intentional omission is con-
sidered sufficient (see note 40 and accompanying text supra) or whether
an actual intent to evade is necessary (see note 80 and accompanying
text supra).
Various unsuccessful attempts have been made to show that the de-
fendant was unable mentally to have the requisite intent and, hence, a lack
of willfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968) (mental distress); United States v. Benus,
196 F. Supp. 601 (D. Pa. 1961), aff'd., 305 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1962) (insanity);
United States v. DiSilvestro, 146 F. Supp. 300 (D. Pa. 1957) (fright). Nei-
ther is ignorance of the law a defense to a crime where willfulness is an
element. However, ignorance of the law may be used to negate the will-
fulness in the failure to perform the required duty. See Yarborough v.
United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956). A
favorite, but unsuccessful defense, has been that the defendant knew that
the tax was due, but had no money, and thought that a return could not
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point to the necessity for the adoption of a very strict standard of
willfulness under section 7203. Both these factors indicate that
it is quite difficult for any defendant, once put on trial under
section 7203, to be acquitted.153 By allowing into evidence the
defendant's prior tax history, for years not in question, the courts
make it quite easy to convict a defendant if such a prior history
of omissions actually existed. 54 There are very few section 7203
cases which reverse in favor of a defendant, let alone acquit at the
trial level.155 The few cases that do reverse in favor of the de-
fendant do so because of the use of an inadequate standard for
willfulness. 5 6 These courts, however, usually recognize that there
would be sufficient evidence to find that the defendant acted
willfully if the proper standard had been applied.157 It is, there-
fore, submitted that a strong standard for willfulness should be
adopted because of the positions that most courts have taken
be filed without the payment accompanying the return. This has not been
deemed sufficient to negate willfulness. Id. at 60-61.
It is quite clear, however, that an oversight, Hargrove v. United
States, 67 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933); a good faith misconception, United States
v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 388 (1933); or even gross negligence, United States v.
Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958), will usually be considered as good
defenses. It should be noted, however, that it has almost been impossible
for people with higher educations to claim good faith or negligence as a
defense. Thus, attorneys, United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968), United States v. Perna, 197 F. Supp. 853
(D. Conn. 1961) (but see, United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847
(D. Ill. 1961); C.P.A.'s, United States v. Doelker, 327 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.
1964) (20 years), Eustis v. United States, 409 F.2d 28 (9th Cir.
1969) ); Government officials, United States v. Cirillo, 251 F.2d 638 (3d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958); businessmen, Pappas v. United
States, 216 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1954); architects, United States v. Johnson,
386 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1967); and college graduates, Martin v. United States,
317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963), have found it difficult to prevail in tax prose-
cutions under section 7203.
However, it is a good defense if another person has prepared the im-
proper return for the taxpayer and the taxpayer has made a full dis-
closure. See Meldman, The Legal Responsibilities of the Person Pre-
paring the Tax Returns and Furnishing Tax Advice and Reliance upon
Advice of Counsel, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 313 (1962). See also Annot., 22
A.L.R.2d 972 (1952).
153. See note 152 supra. But see Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S.
343 (1965); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958); United
States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (D. Ill. 1961), all indicating that it
will be quite difficult to convict for failure to pay.
154. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
155. See United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958).
156. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner
v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Palermo, 259
F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958). But see United States v. McGonigal, 214 F.
Supp. 621 (D. Del. 1963).
157. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
concerning the admissibility of certain evidence in section 7203
cases. Even if a very strong standard is adopted in the defendant's
favor, very few defendants will be acquitted because of the type
of evidence which is admissible and the defenses which have been
rejected.158 Thus, if the court charges or applies a strong standard
for willfulness, it would seem to satisfy the needs of the three
parties involved, i.e. the Government which is striving for a con-
viction, the courts which dislike retrying cases, and the taxpayers.
X. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that neither Murdock nor Spies can be used as
the basis for determining the proper standard for willfulness under
section 7203. At least two lines of reasoning have developed from
each case. Courts have adopted and rejected the Murdock list of
meanings for willfulness and the felony-misdemeanor and failure
to pay-failure to file distinction in Spies. Courts have combined
their determinations concerning the above choices in varying de-
grees with other basic considerations, such as the degree of knowl-
edge or type of bad purpose or specific interest required to convict,
to arrive at their definitions of willfulness. Most of the courts,
however, basically apply the language of Spies and Murdock to
arrive at their definitions, without going into the policy considera-
tions behind those two cases. It has been shown that the various
interpretations which can be attached to an application of Palermo
to other than failure to pay situations highlight the confusion that
courts can, and have created, by relying on the language of Mur-
dock and Spies. It is submitted that an attempt to justify any
different approach by depending on a particular interpretation of
either or both of those decisions would be unwise. Such inter-
pretations have already been justifiably criticized in at least one
decision.159
There is an obvious need to eliminate the existing confusion
and to adopt one standard for willfulness under section 7203 to be
applied in all circuits. This standard should be created from
policy considerations. A "strong" standard should be adopted to
protect the defendants. But this standard would also help the
158. United States v. Johnson, 386 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1967); see Rip-
perger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 940
(1958) (a case in which a weak standard for "bad purpose" was used but
the evidence seems sufficient to convict under any standard). If the court
had chosen, in Ripperger, to reverse because of an improper standard, it
would have been ridiculous, on the evidence. But see United States v.
Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
159. The various interpretations of Spies and Murdock and the cor-
rectness of those approaches have been previously discussed. However, it
is submitted that a combined Palermo and Vitiello approach with the rea-
soning of Haner and Hargrove would be the best approach. These cases
indicate the type of intent required when a criminal statute contains the
additional word "willfully" and also indicates the Congressional intent
behind the statute.
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courts by preventing unneeded reversals. Furthermore, a strong
standard would rarely prevent the Government from obtaining a
conviction. A strong standard is indicated by the fact that Con-
gress used the term "willfully" in both section 7201 and section
7203 without making any distinctions between them. Furthermore,
severe civil fraud penalties are available for tax violations,10 and,
hence, a strong showing of willfulness should be required under
section 7203 to distinguish it from civil sanctions.
The fact that Congress made section 7203 a misdemeanor should
weaken the standard of willfulness needed for conviction. A per-
son can have just as bad an evil purpose when he fails to file or
pay as when he affirmatively attempts to evade the tax.16 1 What-
ever Congress' reasons for making a section 7203 violation a mis-
demeanor, such reasons should not make the courts lessen the
standard for willfulness under section 7203 or make a distinction
between failure to pay and failure to file cases. The difference
between the various violations should be in the type of evidence
which goes to show the specific violations and acts required. Thus,
an affirmative act would have to be shown to convict under sec-
tion 7201 but not under section 7203. Furthermore, a taxpayer's
past history could be used, in addition to his omission to file under
section 7203, in failure to file cases. Courts could reason that a
taxpayer's filing of a proper and timely return helps negate any
indication of willfulness in a section 7203 failure to pay case.'
62
Hence, there is no need for adopting varying standards for willful-
ness under section 7203.
It is, therefore, submitted that one standard for willfulness
should be adopted under section 7203 and that such standard
should be a strong one in favor of the defendant. The following
suggestion is proposed.
Willfulness is an essential element of the crime proscribed
by section 7203. To find that such willfulness is present, it is
not enough to show that the defendant omitted to do the required
act. The fact that the defendant failed to do the required act
because of a good faith misconception or accident is not enough
to find willfulness. Neither would a finding of negligence, laxity,
inadvertence, careless disregard of the duty, or even gross negli-
gence lead to the conclusion that the defendant had been willful.
Three things, in addition to the failure to act, must be shown to
indicate willfulness. First, that the defendant actually knew about
160. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, ch. 68, §§ 6651-6683.
161. 32 TEMP. L.Q. 221 (1959).
162. Id. at 223.
his obligation, but this can be shown by circumstantial evidence.
Second, that the defendant, knowing his obligation, intentionally
and purposefully realizing what he was doing, failed to act. Third,
it must be shown that the defendant acted with a specific wrongful
intent or an evil motive at the time the crime was charged. The
finding of an evil intent should be left to the finder of fact.163
Adoption of the suggested strong standard, considering the
evidence admissibility rules, will help to balance the scales which
are presently heavily weighted against the defendant. 6 4 It will
also help to bring uniformity among the circuits in their decisions
concerning "willfully" under section 7203 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
163. Any mention of a specific bad purpose was intentionally omitted
because it is considered as confusing. However, the actual knowledge
requirement and evil motive test combined to effectively cover that point.
The language in Palermo, indicating that a pattern of defaults may
suggest an evil motive, was omitted because the "circumstantial evidence"
which would be permitted under the proposed standard would cover it.
164. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
